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Standard quantum key distribution protocols are provably secure against eavesdropping attacks,
if quantum theory is correct. It is theoretically interesting to know if we need to assume the validity
of quantum theory to prove the security of quantum key distribution, or whether its security can
be based on other physical principles. The question would also be of practical interest if quantum
mechanics were ever to fail in some regime, because a scientifically and technologically advanced
eavesdropper could perhaps use post-quantum physics to extract information from quantum com-
munications without necessarily causing the quantum state disturbances on which existing security
proofs rely. Here we describe a key distribution scheme provably secure against general attacks by
a post-quantum eavesdropper who is limited only by the impossibility of superluminal signalling.
The security of the scheme stems from violation of a Bell inequality.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a 03.67.Dd 03.65.Ta
With the discoveries of quantum cryptography [1] and
quantum key distribution [2, 3], it is now well under-
stood that cryptographic tasks can be guaranteed secure
by physical principles. For example, we now have proto-
cols for various important tasks, including key distribu-
tion, that are provably secure provided quantum theory
is correct [4]. Protocols for bit commitment have been
developed with security based only on the impossibility
of superluminal signalling [5, 6]. The possibility of bas-
ing cryptographic security on known superselection rules
has also recently been discussed [7, 8].
In this paper we investigate whether it is possible to
devise a quantum key distribution scheme that is prov-
ably secure if superluminal signalling is impossible. We
allow for eavesdroppers who can break the laws of quan-
tum mechanics, as long as nothing they can do implies
the possibility of superluminal signalling. In general, this
will mean that the security proofs of existing quantum
key distribution protocols are no longer valid, as we can
no longer assume that quantum theory correctly predicts
the tradeoff between the information that Eve can ex-
tract and the disturbance she must necessarily cause.
As we show below, there is an intimate connection be-
tween the possibility of such a protocol and the violation
of a Bell inequality [9, 10]. Non-local (in the sense of
Bell inequality violating) correlations constitute an ex-
ploitable resource for this task, just as entanglement is a
resource for conventional quantum key distribution. We
present a quantum scheme, involving Bell violation, that
is secure against general attacks by a non-signalling Eve.
One motivation for this work is practical: existing se-
curity proofs assume the validity of quantum theory, and
while quantum theory has been confirmed in an impres-
sive range of experiments, it remains plausible that some
future experiment will demonstrate a limit to its domain
of validity. Admittedly, it is also conceivable that some
future experiment could demonstrate the possibility of
superluminal signalling. But the possibilities are logi-
cally independent: quantum theory could fail without
violating standard relativistic causality, and vice versa.
A cryptographic scheme that can be guaranteed secure
by either of two physical principles is more trustworthy
than one whose security relies entirely on one.
There are also compelling theoretical motivations. Un-
derstanding which cryptographic tasks can be guaranteed
secure by which physical principles improves our under-
standing of the relationship between information theory
and physical theory. Our work also demonstrates a new
way of proving security for quantum protocols, which
may be useful in other contexts, and sheds new light on
non-locality and its relation to secrecy.
A Quantum Protocol for Secret Bit Distribution
We assume that Alice and Bob have a noise-free
quantum channel and an authenticated classical chan-
nel. Consider the following protocol, which we show
below generates a single shared secret bit, guaran-
teed secure against general attacks by post-quantum
eavesdroppers. Define the bases Xr = {cos rpi2N |0〉 +
sin rpi
2N |1〉,− sin rpi2N |0〉+cos rpi2N |1〉} for integer r. For each
basis, we define outcomes 0 and 1 to correspond respec-
tively to the projections onto the first and second basis
elements. Thus Xr+N contains the same basis states as
Xr with the outcome conventions reversed; i.e. we inter-
2pret the bases X−1 and XN below to be XN−1 and X0
with outcomes reversed. We take the security parameters
N and M (defined below) to be large positive integers.
To simplify the analysis, we will take M ≪ N .
1. Alice and Bob share n = MN2 pairs of systems,
each in the maximally entangled state |ψ−〉 =
1/
√
2(|01〉 − |10〉).
2. Alice and Bob choose independent random ele-
ments riA and r
i
B of the set {0, 1, . . . , N − 1} for
each i from 1 to MN2, and measure their i-th par-
ticle in the bases Ai ≡ Xri
A
and Bi ≡ Xri
B
.
3. When all their measurements are complete, Alice
and Bob announce their bases over a public, au-
thenticated, classical channel.
4. Alice and Bob abort the protocol and restart unless
2MN ≤
∑
i
∑
c=−1,0,1
|{j : Aj = Xi, Bj = Xi+c}| .
(The expected size of the sum is 3MN . The prob-
ability of the condition failing is of order e−MN/6.)
5. The outcomes are kept secret for one randomly cho-
sen pair for which the bases chosen were Xi and
Xi+c for some i and c = −1, 0 or 1. We call bases of
this form neighbouring or identical. The outcomes
are announced for all the remaining pairs (for all
basis choices).
6. Alice and Bob abort the protocol if their outcomes
a and b are not anti-correlated (i.e. a 6= b) in all the
cases where they chose neighbouring or identical
bases.
7. If the protocol is not aborted, their unannounced
outcomes define the secret bit, which is taken by
Alice to be equal to her outcome and by Bob to be
opposite to his.
Eavesdropping attacks
To analyse the security of this protocol, we must de-
scribe formally the actions available to post-quantum
eavesdroppers. To give Eve maximum power, we assume
that each pair of systems is produced by a source under
her control. In a general, or collective, attack, Eve pre-
pares 2n+1 systems in a post-quantum state λ, sending
n systems to Alice, n to Bob, and keeping 1. The state
λ defines measurement probabilities
Pλ(abe|ABE),
where A = {A1, . . . , An}, B = {B1, . . . , Bn} are sets of
Alice’s and Bob’s possible measurement choices and E =
{E1} is a set containing a possible measurement choice
of Eve, with corresponding outcomes a, b, e. This state
may be non-quantum and non-local, but must not allow
signalling even if the parties cooperate. Thus, for any
partitionings A = A1∪A2, B = B1∪B2 and E = E1∪E2
(possibly including empty subsets), and any alternative
choices A¯2, B¯2, E¯2, we require that
∑
a2b2e2
Pλ(a
1a2b1b2e1e2 |A1A2B1B2E1E2) = (1)
∑
a¯2b¯2 e¯2
Pλ(a
1a¯2b1b¯2e1e¯2 |A1A¯2B1B¯2E1E¯2) .
Eve may wait until all Alice’s and Bob’s communications
are finished before performing her measurement.
We need a further technical assumption. It seems nat-
ural to postulate that, once Eve has prepared a post-
quantum state λ, the range of measurements available
to her and their outcome probabilities are (up to rela-
bellings) time-independent. In fact, a slightly weaker as-
sumption suffices: we assume that in post-quantum the-
ory, as in quantum theory, measurements on a shared
state cannot be used to send signals between the parties
in any configuration (even if not spacelike separated). If
this assumption were dropped, one could allow a theory
in which information about the bases and outcomes of
any measurements carried out by Alice and Bob propa-
gates to Eve at light speed, so she can obtain these data
by a later measurement timelike separated from Alice’s
and Bob’s. While theories of this type may seem implau-
sible, or even pathological, they can be made internally
consistent without allowing superluminal communication
[12]. Clearly, secure key distribution would be impossible
if Eve could exploit a theory of this type.
One can justify excluding this possibility by extending
a standard cryptographic assumption to post-quantum
cryptology. Conventional security analyses of quantum
key distribution require that Alice’s and Bob’s laborato-
ries are completely secure against Eve’s scrutiny — a nec-
essary cryptographic assumption, which does not follow
from the laws of quantum theory. Similarly, in the post-
quantum context, we assume that no information about
events in Alice’s and Bob’s laboratories — in particular,
their measurements or outcomes — subsequently propa-
gates to Eve. Put another way, Alice and Bob have to
assume they can establish secure laboratories, else cryp-
tography is pointless. The aim is to guarantee secure
key distribution modulo this assumption. We shall prove
that the protocol above is indeed secure against general
attacks.
Proof of security
We define Aj , Bj to be Alice’s and Bob’s basis choices
for the j-th pair; these are random variables, each mea-
3surement occuring with probability 1/N . We also define
aj , bj to be their measurement outcomes and write
tj =
1
3N
∑
c=−1,0,1
N−1∑
i=0
Pλ(aj 6= bj |Aj = Xi , Bj = Xi+c).
(Recall that X−1 and XN are XN−1 and X0 with out-
comes reversed.) Note that if λ is local we have tj ≤
1− 2
3N . Thus this is a generalised Bell inequality (it is in
fact similar to the chained Bell inequality of Braunstein
and Caves [13].) If there is no eavesdropping, so that
genuine singlet states are shared, then quantum mechan-
ics gives tj = 1 − O(1/(N2)), for all j, thus violating
the inequality for large enough N . This is crucial for the
security of the protocol; it is violation of this inequality
that allows Eve’s knowledge to be bounded. Below, we
shall derive a lower bound on the value of ts for the secret
pair s, given that Alice’s and Bob’s tests are passed, and
given that Eve is not using a strategy that almost always
fails the tests. Then we show that the lower bound on ts
implies an upper bound on Eve’s information, which can
be made arbitrarily small as M,N become large.
From now on, we assume that there is at least one pair
for which Alice’s and Bob’s measurements were neigh-
bouring or identical (otherwise they will abort). Let s, a
random variable, be the index of the pair chosen to de-
fine the secret bit. A post-quantum state λ determines
the probability Pλ(pass) that Alice’s and Bob’s tests are
passed, so that they do not abort the protocol.
Lemma For any λ such that Pλ(pass) > ǫ, we
have that
Pλ(as 6= bs|pass) > 1− 1/(2MNǫ).
Proof Let m, a random variable, be the number
of pairs for which the measurements were neighbouring
or identical. For a given pair, let C be the condition that
the measurements were neighbouring or identical and the
outcomes anti-correlated. If the secret pair satisfies C,
then Alice and Bob will agree on the value of the secret
bit. We denote by #(C) the number of pairs for which C
holds. Define the following four mutually exclusive and
collectively exhaustive events.
E0 m < 2MN
E1 m ≥ 2MN and #(C) < m− 1
E2 m ≥ 2MN and #(C) = m− 1
E3 m ≥ 2MN and #(C) = m.
Note that if E0 or E1 occurs, then Alice and Bob will
definitely abort. If E3 occurs, then Alice and Bob will
definitely not abort. A given post-quantum state λ de-
fines a probability for each of these four events, which we
write as Pλ(Ei) ≡ qi.
Now we have Pλ(pass) = q3 + q2 Pλ(pass|E2). If E2
occurs, then the test will only be passed if the secret pair
do not satisfy C. This means that we have
Pλ(pass|E2) =
MN2∑
i=2MN
P(m = i|E2)/i
≤ 1/(2MN). (2)
But Pλ(pass) > ǫ, so we can write q3 > ǫ − q2/(2MN).
Therefore
Pλ(as 6= bs|pass) = q3
q3 + q2 Pλ(pass|E2)
> 1− 1/(2MNǫ), (3)
where the inequality follows from the fact that the right
hand side of the first line either equals 1 or is monotoni-
cally increasing with q3. QED.
It follows from the lemma above, the no-signalling con-
dition (1) and the chain rule for conditional probabilities
that, conditioned on passing the test,
ts > 1− 1/(2MNǫ). (4)
From now on, we assume that the test is passed, and we
can consider that Alice, Bob and Eve share three sys-
tems, such that Eq. (4) is satisfied. We now show that
the knowledge that Eve can get by performing a mea-
surement on her system is small.
We do this by contradiction. Thus suppose that with
probability δ > 0, Eve gets an outcome e0 such that
Pλ(as = b, bs = b¯ |As = Xk, Bs = Xk+d, e0)
> (1/2)(1 + δ′),
for some k and d = −1, 0 or 1, where δ′ > 0 and b ∈
{0, 1}. Define
pAi ≡ Pλ(as = b|As = Xi , e0)
pBi ≡ Pλ(bs = b¯|Bs = Xi , e0),
The no-signalling condition (1) ensures that pAi is in-
dependent of which measurement Bob performs, and
similarly that pBi is independent of which measurement
Alice performs. This enables us to write pAk , p
B
k+d >
(1/2)(1 + δ′). Now
Pλ(as 6= bs |As = Xi, Bs = Xi+c, e0) =
Pλ(as = b, bs = b¯ |As = Xi, Bs = Xi+c, e0)
+ Pλ(as = b¯, bs = b |As = Xi, Bs = Xi+c, e0)
≤ min(pAi , pBi+c) + min(1− pAi , 1− pBi+c)
= 1− |pAi − pBi+c| .
4Now, using (1) again and the triangle inequality, we have
∑
c=−1,0,1
N−1∑
i=0
Pλ(as 6= bs |As = Xi, Bs = Xi+c, e0)
≤ 3N −
∑
c=−1,0,1
N−1∑
i=0
|pAi − pBi+c|
≤ 3N −
N−1∑
i=0
|pAi − pAi+1|
≤ 3N − |2pAk − 1|
≤ 3N − δ′ .
This implies that, conditioned only on passing the test,
ts ≤ 1− (δδ′)/(3N). (5)
For any fixed δ, δ′ > 0, we can choose M,N, ǫ such that
this is inconsistent with Eq. (4). M must also be cho-
sen so that quantum correlations are unlikely to fail the
test. For example, takingM = N3/4 , ǫ = N−1/4 achieves
this for sufficiently large N . (Note that if Alice’s and
Bob’s outcomes are classically correlated via a local hid-
den variable theory, the chances of passing the test are
very small, and there exists no choice of parameters for
which Eqs. (4) and (5) are inconsistent.)
Although we restricted the security parameterM ≪ N
to simplify the discussion, the protocol can be generalised
to allow M arbitrarily large. In this case, Alice’s and
Bob’s security test is that the number of pairs for which
the outcomes are not anti-correlated should be statisti-
cally consistent with quantum predictions; the method
of our security proof generalises to cover this case.
Discussion
The above security proof shows that our protocol al-
lows Alice and Bob to generate a single shared bit and
guarantee its security even against collective attacks by
a post-quantum Eve. The protocol can be generalised to
generate an arbitrary shared secret bit string, with the
same security guarantee.
Non-locality is crucial to the success of the protocol.
It is easy to see that if Alice and Bob were violating no
Bell inequality, then Eve could eavesdrop perfectly by
preparing each pair of systems in a post-quantum state
that is deterministic (where deterministic means that all
probabilities defined by the state are 0 or 1) and local.
This would give Eve perfect information about Alice’s
and Bob’s measurement outcomes. On the other hand, if
Alice and Bob are violating a Bell inequality, then at least
some of the post-quantum states prepared by Eve must
be non-local. But any state that is deterministic and non-
local allows signalling [14]. So this trivial eavesdropping
strategy is not available to Eve.
More generally, we can say that the protocol works be-
cause, once the no-signalling condition is assumed, non-
local correlations satisfy a monogamy condition analo-
gous to that of entanglement in quantum theory. The
monogamy of non-locality was first noted in Ref. [11],
where it was shown that no signalling implies that there
exist certain sets of non-quantum correlations such that
Alice’s and Bob’s outcomes cannot be correlated with a
third party. Here we have shown that there are quantum
correlations with the same property, and used these to
construct a key distribution protocol.
It is interesting to contrast the Ekert quantum key dis-
tribution protocol [3], in which a test of the Clauser-
Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality [10] is per-
formed. It may appear as if non-locality is playing a
crucial roˆle here, too. In this case, however, the pur-
pose of the CHSH inequality test is to verify that the
shared states are close to singlets — and this is a task
that other measurements, not involving non-locality, can
perform equally well [15].
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